Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 3

Issue 1

2021

The Rescue of American International Group Module D: Maiden
Lane II
Lily S. Engbith
Yale School of Management

Devyn Jeffereis
Yale School of Management

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons,
Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Insurance Commons,
Macroeconomics Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and
the Political Economy Commons

Recommended Citation
Engbith, Lily S. and Jeffereis, Devyn (2021) "The Rescue of American International Group Module D:
Maiden Lane II," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1, 118-144.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol3/iss1/5

This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

The Rescue of American International Group
Module D: Maiden Lane II1
Lily S. Engbith2 and Devyn Jeffereis3,4
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
November 15, 2019, revised: April 15, 2021
Abstract
In September 2008, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing difficulty in
returning cash collateral to counterparties looking to terminate, rather than roll over, their
securities lending agreements, in part because the company had invested the collateral in
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which were becoming illiquid. The Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) provided liquidity to the company, including through
the Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF), which allowed for the repayment of cash collateral
but did not address the falling values of the RMBS. In November 2008, the Federal Reserve
Board authorized the creation of Maiden Lane II (ML II), a special-purpose vehicle that would
utilize a $1 billion equity contribution from AIG and a $19.5 billion senior loan from the
FRBNY to purchase the illiquid RMBS. ML II would repay the loan with the proceeds from the
_____________________________________________________________________
1 This

case study is one of seven 2021 Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) case modules considering the
various elements of the government’s rescue of American International Group:
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module A: The Conservatorships” by Daniel Thompson
and Rosalind Z. Wiggins.
•

“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module B: The Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreements (SPSPAs)” by Daniel Thompson.

•

“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module C: GSE Credit Facility” by Emily Vergara.

•

“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’s GSE MBS Purchase Program” by
Michael Zanger-Tishler and Rosalind Z. Wiggins.

•

“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008” by Daniel Thompson.

•

“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module F: The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset
Purchase (LSAP) Program” by Daniel Thompson and Adam Kulam.

•

“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module Z: Overview” by Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Benjamin
Henken, Daniel Thompson, Adam Kulam, and Andrew Metrick.

Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
2

Lily S. Engbith - Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.

3

Devyn Jeffereis - Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.

A special thanks to the insightful input and feedback provided by Zachary Taylor and Larry Cordell. Please
note that any information contained in this study that may be attributed to these two individuals reflect their
personal views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, or the Federal Reserve System.
4

118

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 1

eventual sale of the RMBS. Upon the establishment of ML II, the SBF was terminated. ML II
helped to lessen AIG’s exposure to the illiquid RMBS market and avert a downgrade, both of
which ultimately contributed to AIG’s stabilization.
Keywords: AIG, asset purchase, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Maiden Lane II,
residential mortgage-backed securities, securities lending, senior loan
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American International Group, Inc.:
Maiden Lane II
At a Glance
In
September
2008,
American
International Group (AIG) faced increasing
pressure to return cash collateral to
counterparties looking to terminate, rather
than roll over, their securities lending
agreements (US COP 2010, 68). The
company faced difficulty meeting these
obligations because it had invested the
collateral into non-agency residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which
were becoming illiquid (McDonald and
Paulson 2015, 86). In October 2008, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(FRBNY) had provided AIG with up to $37.8
billion in cash through the Securities
Borrowing Facility.5 But AIG’s life
insurance subsidiaries had retained the
distressed
and
illiquid
residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) into
which AIG had reinvested those
counterparties’ cash collateral (US COP
2010, 68-71).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To facilitate the purchase of non-agency
RMBS from AIG insurance subsidiaries in order to
reduce market exposure and relieve downgrade
pressures relating to AIG’s reinvestment of cash
collateral in the illiquid RMBS market (FRBNY n.d.1).
Announcement Date

November 10, 2008

Operational Date

December 12, 2008

Termination Date

November 12, 2014

Legal Authority

Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act

Amount Authorized

Up to $22.5 billion
senior loan to ML II
from FRBNY

AIG Participation

$1 billion deferred
purchase price

Peak Utilization

$19.5 billion from
FRBNY to purchase
RMBS with a par value
of $39.3 billion

Participants

AIG, FRBNY

On November 10, 2008, the Federal
Reserve Board and the US Treasury announced the first restructuring of federal financial
support for AIG (FRBNY 2008a). Among other provisions, the updated arrangement allowed
for the establishment of a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) in the form of a limited liability
company to be named Maiden Lane II (ML II), which would purchase those securities from
AIG (FRBNY 2008a; US COP 2010, 71; McDonald and Paulson 2015, 84).
The Federal Reserve Board (under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act) authorized the
FRBNY to lend a maximum of $22.5 billion to ML II to acquire the RMBS (FRBNY 2008a). On
December 12, 2008, ML II borrowed approximately $19.5 billion from the FRBNY in order to
purchase from AIG a bundle of RMBS with a total fair market value of $20.5 billion, a 49%
discount to their par value of $39.3 billion as of October 31, 2008 (FRBNY n.d.1). Proceeds
_____________________________________________________________________
5

See Buchholtz, Engbith, and Jeffereis 2021 for more information on AIG’s Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF).
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from the establishment of ML II were used to refund the cash collateral posted by the FRBNY
in its assumed role as counterparty under the Securities Borrowing Facility (FRBNY 2008a).
The AIG securities lending program and the associated Securities Borrowing Facility were
thereby terminated (FRBNY 2008a).
In March 2011, the FRBNY announced it would be offering the purchased assets for sale in a
series of competitive auctions, which occurred through February 28, 2012, when sales were
completed (FRBNY 2011; FRBNY n.d.1 ). ML II and its associated operations were
terminated on November 12, 2014 (FRBNY n.d.1 ). In total, the management of ML II would
result in a net gain for the benefit of the public of approximately $2.8 billion (FRBNY 2012).
Summary Evaluation
The establishment of Maiden Lane II as a vehicle for the purchase of illiquid RMBS off AIG’s
balance sheet proved successful in reducing AIG’s exposure to the distressed and illiquid
RMBS market and arresting related cash demands, which helped it avert further creditrating downgrades (Baxter and Dahlgren 2010, 4). Still, the intervention was subject to some
questions and criticisms regarding the fit of its structure within Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act and the fiscal soundness of lending for investment in risky RMBS (US COP 2010,
228, 251; McDonald and Paulson 2015, 103). However, the ability to avoid fire-sale prices
through a buy-and-hold strategy allowed the FRBNY to realize a net gain when the assets
were sold.
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American International Group 2008: United States Context
GDP
$14,681.5 billion in 2007
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
$47,976 in 2007
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
$48,383 in 2008
converted to USD)
Sovereign credit rating (fiveAs of Q4, 2007:
year senior debt)
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008:

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a
percentage of GDP
Size of banking system as a
percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of
banking system
Foreign involvement in banking
system
Government ownership of
banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008
62.9% in 2007
68.3% in 2008
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of financial
system in 2007
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of financial
system in 2008
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008
22% of total banking assets in 2007
18% of total banking assets in 2008
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008

100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 for
2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 for
2008
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World Bank,
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Overview

Background
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, AIG operated a securities lending program under which
its insurance subsidiaries lent out high-quality securities to counterparties in exchange for
cash collateral (McDonald and Paulson 2015, 85). That collateral would then be reinvested
by a separate arm of AIG (McDonald and Paulson 2015, 85). When counterparties wanted to
exit the contracts, it was expected that the investments would be sold to produce cash to
repay the collateral (McDonald and Paulson 2015, 86). In the time leading up to September
2008, AIG, primarily through a non-insurance subsidiary called AIG Global Securities
Lending (GSL), had been reinvesting its counterparties’ cash collateral primarily in the
relatively illiquid residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market (which was
experiencing increasing strain) instead of the short-term, highly liquid securities usually
relied on by securities lending programs (McDonald and Paulson 2015, 85). This resulted in
a significant maturity mismatch, as most of the securities lending contracts were for a onemonth term (McDonald and Paulson 2015, 85). In mid-2008, AIG’s counterparties began
withdrawing from lending agreements at an accelerated rate as AIG reported growing losses
and was subject to credit rating downgrades (McDonald and Paulson 2015, 86). GSL was
unable to meet the growing collateral obligations because of losses on its investments and
increasing illiquidity (McDonald and Paulson 2015, 86-87).
In response to the critical liquidity situation stemming from securities lending contract
withdrawals and other distressed businesses, on September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve
(under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act) extended to AIG an $85 billion loan in the
form of the Revolving Credit Facility (RCF)6 (US COP 2010, 55-57). However, the credit line
proved insufficient in solving AIG’s liquidity dilemma (Baxter and Dahlgren 2010, 4). By
October 1, 2008, AIG had utilized approximately $62 billion of the RCF, some of which had
been used to settle collateral transactions with counterparties returning (rather than rolling
over) securities that had been borrowed through the securities lending program (US COP
2010, 137).
Given volatile market conditions and the expectation that counterparties would not want to
renew their securities lending contracts, on October 8, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (FRBNY) established the Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF)7 (US COP 2010, 6869). As part of the agreement, the FRBNY was authorized to extend to AIG subsidiaries an
additional amount of credit, up to $37.8 billion. The FRBNY would effectively provide cash
collateral to take over the positions of securities borrowers who were returning investmentgrade, fixed-income securities to AIG’s life insurance subsidiaries (US COP 2010, 68). The
program would bolster AIG’s liquidity and allow the FRBNY to hold the borrowed securities
as collateral (US COP 2010, 68). However, while the SBF enabled AIG to return cash collateral
to its counterparties, the company still had to contend with the falling values of the illiquid
non-agency RMBS in which it had invested the cash collateral (Baxter and Dahlgren 2010, 4;
_____________________________________________________________________
6
7

See Buchholtz and Lawson 2021 for more information on AIG’s Revolving Credit Facility (RCF).
See Engbith, Buchholtz, and Jeffereis 2021 for more information on AIG’s Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF).
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McDonald and Paulson 2015, 87). If AIG had sold the securities under prevailing market
conditions, it would have been forced to accept fire-sale prices, resulting in further losses for
the firm (US COP 2010, 141).
Program Description
On November 10, 2008, the Fed and Treasury announced the first restructuring of the AIG
rescue package in order to “establish a more durable capital structure, resolve liquidity
issues, facilitate AIG's execution of its plan to sell certain businesses in an orderly manner,
promote market stability, and protect the interests of the U.S. government and taxpayers”
(BdofGov 2008). Among other actions, the restructuring included “the New York Fed
[lending] up to $22.5 billion to a newly formed limited liability company (LLC) to fund the
LLC’s purchase of residential mortgage-backed securities from AIG’s U.S. securities lending
collateral portfolio.” The new LLC would be named Maiden Lane II LLC (ML II) and would be
a Delaware-based limited liability company characterized as a special-purpose vehicle (SPV)
(US COP 2010, 228). Using the loan from the FRBNY, ML II would purchase non-agency RMBS
assets from AIG subsidiaries and hold them for orderly liquidation (FRBNY 2008a; FRBNY
n.d.1). AIG would use the proceeds received from ML II’s purchases of RMBS to return the
cash collateral posted by the FRBNY in transactions under the SBF, after which the SBF would
terminate (US COP 2010, 71).
The purchase was financed by a $19.5 billion senior loan8 from the FRBNY (FRBNY n.d.1).
The loan specified a six-year duration that could be extended at the discretion of the FRBNY
and an interest rate set at one-month LIBOR plus 100 basis points (2.6% as of December 16,
2008) (FRBNY 2008a). As part of the agreement, AIG was required to post $1 billion to cover
potential losses, also known as the “Fixed Deferred Purchase Price” (FRBNY n.d.1). The AIG
contribution would accrue at a rate of one-month LIBOR plus 300 basis points (4.6% as of
December 16, 2008) (FRBNY 2008a).
Payments on the FRBNY loan would be made in monthly installments starting in January
2009, subject to receipt of proceeds from the RMBS portfolio (i.e., the principal interest from
amortization of mortgages and other loans underlying the RMBS). Proceeds from the
maturity and or sale of the RMBS (see Figure 1) were to be applied in a waterfall structure,
starting with any expenses incurred by the LLC, then the outstanding FRBNY loan and
interest, and finally AIG’s Fixed Deferred Purchase Price and its interest (FRBNY 2008a). Any
residual income or remaining funds would be divided between the FRBNY (83%) and AIG
(17%) (FRBNY 2008a).

_____________________________________________________________________
8 It was

originally thought that a FRBNY loan of $19.8 billion would be needed to purchase the RMBS, as the fair
market value was first established at $20.8 billion; AIG would contribute $1 billion toward the purchase (the
Fixed Deferred Purchase Price) (FRBNY n.d.1). However, because of interest and principal payments occurring
between the initial valuation date of October 31, 2008, and the settlement date of December 12, 2008, which
inured to AIG, the loan amount was reduced by $0.3 billion to $19.5 billion (FRBNY n.d.1).
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On December 12, 2008, Maiden Lane II purchased RMBS from AIG subsidiaries at an
estimated fair market value of $20.5 billion (as of October 31, 2008), par value $39.3 billion
(FRBNY n.d.1).
Figure 1: Maiden Lane II LLC (Non-Agency RMBS) Asset Composition by Fair Value9

Source: “FRBNY n.d.1 ”
Pursuant to an Amended and Restated Investment Management Agreement entered into by
and among FRBNY, BlackRock Financial Management Inc. (BlackRock), and ML II, originally
dated December 12, 2008 (and amended and restated August 23, 2010), the FRBNY retained
BlackRock to act as investment manager for the ML II assets (Investment Management
Agreement 2010, 1, 19). BlackRock’s “objective for ML II LLC’s portfolio was to repay the
New York Fed’s senior loan (including principal and interest) while striving to maximize
sales proceeds and refraining from disturbing general financial market conditions” (FRBNY
n.d.1). BlackRock was able to advise the FRBNY on the valuations of the assets and assist it
in selecting those for purchase (FRBNY n.d.1). In accordance with the Investment
Management Agreement, specific individuals in the Investment Support Office (ISO) of the
FRBNY were appointed to manage the ongoing relationship with BlackRock and oversee its
management of ML II assets (Investment Management Agreement 2010, 2). The ISO officer’s
responsibilities included acting as point of contact, assessing BlackRock’s performance,
modifying investment objectives and risk limits, monitoring the risk composition of assets
held, and other functions outlined in the Investment Management Agreement (Investment
Management Agreement 2010, 2-3). BlackRock was limited to reinvesting cash proceeds
from the sale of assets solely in liquid, short-term securities such as US Treasury or agency
securities with a remaining maturity of one year or less, US 2a-7 government money market
funds, and reverse repurchase agreements collateralized US Treasury securities (FRBNY

_____________________________________________________________________
9

The recategorization of assets likely led the Option ARM RMBS balance appearing in YE 2009.
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n.d.1). Moreover, when it came time to sell the assets, BlackRock ran the bid list process that
was standard in the industry (FRBNY 2011).
FRBNY also hired Bank of New York Mellon, Deloitte and Touche LLP, and Ernst & Young LLP
to perform various functions. Bank of New York Mellon acted as administrator and custodian
on behalf of ML II. These services included accounting services, report preparation,
reconciliation of cash and asset balances, valuation services, and other actions outlined in
the Transaction Documents (Administration Agreement 2008, 2-7). Deloitte and Touche was
contracted to perform audit services, performing an audit on the annual financial statements
for ML II (FRBNY n.d.2; ML II LLC: Financial Statements 2014, 4-5). Ernst & Young provided
closing work, performing an assessment on the operational and financial close procedures
and assisting with the analysis of accounting matters (FRBNY n.d.2 ).
Outcomes
The sales of ML II assets and winding-down of the SPV’s operations occurred over a threeyear period, beginning in 2011 (see Figure 2). On March 30, 2011, the FRBNY declined AIG’s
$15.7 billion offer to buy back all of the ML II assets, instead deciding that it would sell the
assets in competitive auctions over time (Roose 2012).10 The FRBNY cited the improved
conditions in the market for non-agency RMBS and a high level of interest from investors as
justification that this strategy would work to both “maximize sale proceeds while also
reducing the likelihood that any one institution ends up with concentrated exposure to the
assets” (FRBNY 2011). According to a Reuters report at the time, Wall Street investors were
also optimistic about the FRBNY’s announcement because of rising scarcity value in the
RMBS market “and because RMBS [as a class] at loss-adjusted yields near 7 percent are
offering higher returns than junk-rated corporate debt” (Berkowitz and Cook 2011).
The process for selling the ML II assets as described by the FRBNY allowed for broad
competitive bidding but also permitted firms to make targeted offers for specific groups of
assets:
“BlackRock Solutions will offer the securities for sale using the standard bid list
process in the secondary market for RMBS securities. The bid list process involves
marketing a list of securities from the portfolio via multiple broker dealers to obtain
the best available price for each security.
Over time, the Federal Reserve will also entertain investor inquiries to acquire
specific parcels of securities where these offer superior value, though no such bid will
be accepted without being put into competition with other interested investors. In
such cases, investors may submit offers for parcels of securities directly (without
necessarily going through a dealer).” (FRBNY 2011).
Between April 1, 2011, and June 30, 2011, Maiden Lane II sold assets worth approximately
$4.7 billion to 22 purchasers over nine separate auctions (FRBNY 2011b). On January 19,
_____________________________________________________________________
Despite the FRBNY’s refusal to sell the entire RMBS portfolio to AIG, it was announced on February 24, 2012,
by AIG Chief Executive Officer Robert H. Benmosche that the company had purchased $2.0 billion in ML II assets
from “auction winners” (Roose 2012).
10
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2012,11 the FRBNY sold $7.01 billion (face value) of RMBS assets to Credit Suisse Securities
(USA) LLC, as a result of a reverse bid process initiated by Goldman Sachs & Co., which lost
in the competitive process that involved four broker-dealers (FRBNY 2012b). On February
8, 2012, the FRBNY announced that Goldman Sachs won the bid among five other brokerdealers to purchase ML II assets totaling $6.2 billion (face value) (FRBNY 2012a). The sale
enabled the repayment of the entire remaining principal balance of the FRBNY loan to ML II
in March 2012 ((FRBNY 2012a).
On February 28, 2012, it was announced that Credit Suisse had purchased the remaining $6.0
billion (face value) of ML II assets (FRBNY 2012c). Proceeds from this sale and previous
sales, as well as cash flows from the RMBS prior to sale, enabled ML II to repay the accrued
interest on the FRBNY loan (totaling approximately $580 million) and the AIG Fixed Deferred
Purchase Price plus interest, as well as “provide residual income” to be disbursed according
to the guidelines set forth in the original agreement (see Figure 3) (FRBNY 2012c). The
FRBNY also reported that the sale of assets and repayment of the loan would result in “a net
gain for the benefit of the public of approximately $2.8 billion” (FRBNY 2012c).
Figure 2: Sales of Maiden Lane II Assets in Competitive Auction Over Time
Announcement
Date

April 1,
2011—June
30, 2011
Auction Winner 22 individual
counterparties

January 19,
2012

February 8,
2012

February 28,
2012

Goldman Sachs
& Co.

Face Value12
$9.96 billion
Cash Proceeds
$4.68 billion
Use of Proceeds Pay down
balance of the
FRBNY senior
loan

Credit Suisse
Securities
(USA) LLC
$7.01 billion
$3.18 billion
Pay down
balance of the
FRBNY senior
loan

Credit Suisse
Securities
(USA) LLC
$6.02 billion
$3.63 billion
Repay interest
accrued on the
FRBNY senior
loan and the
AIG junior
deferred
purchase price
plus interest;
provide
“residual
income”

$6.22 billion
$3.53 billion
Pay off
remaining
balance of the
FRBNY senior
loan

Source: FRBNY n.d.1
_____________________________________________________________________
The FRBNY reported no transactions occurring between June 30, 2011, and December 31, 2011.
Note that the face value of these transactions will not sum to original face value of $39.3 billion due to writedowns, matured assets, and interest paid on amortized loans.
11
12
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Figure 3: Senior Loan Balance Repayment and $2.8 Billion Net Gain Earned for the
Public

Source: FRBNY n.d.1
On September 15, 2014, all residual funds in ML II were distributed to the FRBNY and AIG,
with 83% going to the FRBNY and 17% to AIG, according to the original agreement (FRBNY
n.d.1). On November 12, 2014, Maiden Lane II formally ceased to exist as a legal entity after
final repayment of all trailing expenses (FRBNY n.d.1).

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. Maiden Lane II was created as part of a multifaceted intervention.
Maiden Lane II was one of a set of government interventions assisting AIG in addressing its
liquidity and capital problems. It was announced alongside Maiden Lane III (ML III) in
November 2008 as a restructuring of government financial support (FRBNY n.d.1). These
two SPVs were aimed at removing assets from AIG’s balance sheet to address continuing,
significant liquidity drains and to improve its capitalization in the interest of avoiding rating
downgrades (Baxter and Dahlgren 2010, 4). Specifically, ML II was the second action taken
by the Fed to address the impact of the AIG securities lending program. The first was the
establishment of the SBF in October 2008, which allowed the FRBNY to lend up to $37.8
billion on an overnight basis in exchange for fixed-income securities (US COP 2010, 68-69).
At that time, it was acknowledged that while the SBF addressed the liquidity issues raised by
the securities lending program, the RMBS still posed a problem, as they continued to lose
value. Thus, ML II was seen as an ultimate solution (Interview with Sarah Dahlgren 2018). In
all, AIG-targeted government interventions totaling $182 billion would be funded by the
FRBNY and Treasury, including loans, asset purchases, and capital investments (Massad
2012).
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2. The Federal Reserve authorized the loan to Maiden Lane II pursuant to its
emergency lending authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
The Federal Reserve Board authorized the FRBNY to make a loan of up to $22.5 billion to
fund ML II for the purpose of purchasing from AIG a portfolio of RMBS assets (BdofGov 2008;
FRBNY n.d.1). This authorization was done pursuant to Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act, the board’s emergency lending authority, which had three basic requirements: (1) the
Board must determine that “unusual and exigent” circumstances exist, by the affirmative
vote of at least five members, (2) the loans must be secured to the satisfaction of the lending
reserve bank, and (3) the lending reserve bank “must have obtained evidence that adequate
credit was not available from other banking institutions” (Title 12 U.S.C. 343, 112). There has
been little dispute regarding the first and third criteria.
However, ML II “provides a less straightforward fit with the Federal Reserve’s authority
under Section 13(3), and in particular the second criteria cited above, because of its more
complicated structure,” compared with the Fed’s use of Section 13(3) for the two previous
AIG lending facilities (US COP 2010, 228). Although an SPV is a “person” within the terms of
Section 13(3) and thus could be eligible for a loan, the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP)13
noted that “In substance, however, FRBNY was lending money to itself under Section 13(3)
and then using the funds to purchase RMBS” (US COP 2010, 229). Despite this structure,
undertaken for practical administrative purposes, the Fed Board staff defended the
transaction as consistent with Section 13(3) (US COP 2010, 229). It argued that looking
through the SPV, the Fed was in essence discounting “each RMBS [which] was itself a
promissory note or debt obligation so FRBNY was essentially purchasing a note or debt
obligation at a discount (a practice that fits more neatly under its 13(3) lending authority)”
(US COP 2010, 229). The Board staff also characterized these transactions as involving a
“haircut” because of the difference (almost 50%) between the loan amount (used to purchase
the RMBS) and their face value (US COP 2010, 229). The COP did not agree with this
characterization, arguing that the loan “did not require a ‘haircut’ in the normal sense of the
term” because “securities lending counterparties were not required to take a haircut or make
concessions.” Still, COP concluded that because of the great difference in the purchase price
and face value of the RMBS, which secured the loan, the FRBNY was justified in finding the
loan secured to its satisfaction as required by Section 13(3) (US COP 2010, 229).
3. Legal and time constraints led the FRBNY to reject alternative options.
There were a number of alternatives that aimed to resolve the RMBS issues facing AIG that
were considered in the lead-up to the creation of ML II (GAO 2011, 47). One potential
strategy included propping up the insurance subsidiaries and maintaining their credit rating
until their sale (GAO 2011, 47). This would have been achieved through “keepwell”
_____________________________________________________________________
The Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) was a standing committee established by the US Congress following
the implementation of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) on October 3, 2008 and was dissolved in
2011. The COP’s mandate was to “review the current state of financial markets and the regulatory system.” It
was able to hold hearings, review official data, and write reports on actions taken by Treasury and financial
institutions and their effect on the economy.
13
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agreements and excess-of-loss reinsurance agreements (GAO 2011, 47). The keepwell
agreements would have required the Fed to maintain minimum measures for each
subsidiary such as capital and net worth, while the excess-of-loss reinsurance would have
covered situations when subsidiaries failed to make a payment on a claim, subject to certain
limitations (GAO 2011, 47). Although this strategy would have insulated the credit rating of
the subsidiaries from the credit rating of their AIG parent company, it ran into legal hurdles
(GAO 2011, 48). In particular, there were questions regarding whether the government
could protect the value of subsidiaries that were currently acting as collateral for the
Revolving Credit Facility (GAO 2011, 48). There were also concerns regarding whether the
Fed could prevent the subsidiaries from being seized by state regulators (GAO 2011, 48).
Ring-fencing subsidiaries by segregating specific assets was considered as well (GAO 2011,
48). However, it was rejected because of time constraints and lack of a legal framework (GAO
2011, 48).
4. The Fed decided to purchase non-agency RMBS from AIG insurance subsidiaries to
alleviate liquidity pressures and cap AIG’s losses associated with its securities
lending portfolio.
The previous creation of the SBF had alleviated liquidity pressures originating from
securities lending counterparties terminating rather than rolling over their contracts. But
AIG faced continued exposure to “further declines in the value of the RMBS portfolio (par
value approximately $40 billion) purchased with the proceeds of these securities lending
transactions” (Section 129 2008, 7). By September 30, 2008, AIG had already suffered
approximately $16.5 billion in mark-to-market losses on the RMBS portfolio (Section 129
2008, 7).
In considering how to resolve the problem posed by the RMBS related to AIG’s Securities
Lending Program, the FRBNY consulted BlackRock, whose analysts concluded that the
securities would return a higher value if held over a longer time period (US COP 2010, 141).
Although these RMBS were distressed, they were rated AAA and senior tranche in their
respective capital structures (US COP 2010, 35). This increased the likelihood of material
interest and principal income over a longer holding period. As a result, the FRBNY decided
to purchase the RMBS from AIG, which resulted in the termination of the Securities
Borrowing Facility and permanent relief of related liquidity pressures. Unlike AIG or other
financial institutions in distress, the FRBNY did not face intense pressures that would
necessitate the fire sale of securities (US COP 2010, 141). Thus, it could bear the risk involved
in holding the RMBS for a longer period of time, and ideally the market could stabilize.14

_____________________________________________________________________
Even following their purchase by and transfer to ML II, the value of the RMBS underlying transactions made
by AIG’s insurance subsidiaries kept falling at an alarming rate as real estate prices plummeted and foreclosure
numbers soared (McDonald and Paulson 2015, 86, 97-98). Additionally, there was widespread and justifiable
anxiety that the assets would continue to suffer losses even after government rescue (US COP 2010, 77). Despite
this market pessimism, when the last of the assets were sold in February 2012, the government had realized a
net profit of $2.8 billion (FRBNY 2012c).
14
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The RMBS purchased were reviewed and selected by the FRBNY in conjunction with financial
adviser BlackRock Financial Management Inc. (FRBNY n.d.1).15 In addition to limiting AIG’s
exposure to the falling values of illiquid RMBS, the creation of ML II allowed the FRBNY to
meet its objective of helping AIG avoid further credit rating downgrades, which likely would
have triggered new rounds of collateral calls from counterparties to other AIG businesses
(US COP 2010, 141; Baxter and Dahlgren 2010, 3-4). The FRBNY senior loan was to be repaid
using the cash flows from the RMBS and proceeds from the sale of assets (FRBNY 2008a).
The Fed established ML II as a legally independent entity to facilitate the acquisition of nonagency RMBS from AIG subsidiaries (FRBNY 2008a). On December 12, 2008, ML II,
borrowing $19.5 billion from the FRBNY senior loan and utilizing a $1.0 billion cash
contribution posted by AIG in the form of a Fixed Deferred Purchase Price (for a total
purchase price of $20.5 billion), acquired RMBS with a face value of $39.3 billion from several
AIG insurance subsidiaries (FRBNY n.d.1).
5. The Fed created a special-purpose vehicle to purchase the AIG RMBS assets rather
than acquire them directly.
The Federal Reserve did not possess the authority to purchase the RMBS directly off the
balance sheets of AIG insurance subsidiaries (Title 12 U.S.C. 342, 111). It was, however, able
to facilitate the senior loan to ML II, an SPV and independent legal entity that it created for
that purpose (FRBNY 2008a). Holding the RMBS assets in an independent entity made it
easier for the FRBNY to isolate and manage the assets, even though they were consolidated
onto the Fed’s balance sheet (US COP 2010, 228-229). Although ML II was a separate entity,
the FRBNY retained all authority to manage the SPV as long as its loan was outstanding
(FRBNY 2008a).
6. The FRBNY retained BlackRock Financial Management Inc. as the investment
manager along with other outside vendors for various duties.
As the controlling party of ML II, the FRBNY was tasked with the day-to-day management of
ML II’s assets and engaged a number of vendors based on their expertise, rather than
developing internal departments for each need. However, the FRBNY did increase its internal
expertise through targeted hiring in order to assist in decision-making and effectively
evaluate recommendations from external vendors. The Investment Support Office
department, which managed vendor relations, grew from just a few staff members to a
sizable business unit once all three SPVs were being managed. The FRBNY chose to retain
BlackRock Financial Management Inc., which was “acknowledged as an expert in mortgages,
loans, structured finance and risk management” to act as investment manager (Investment
Management Agreement 2010, 1; FRBNY n.d.1). Prior to being brought on to work on ML II,
_____________________________________________________________________
A tangential issue arose in 2011 when AIG sued Bank of America (acquirer of Countrywide) on claims of
fraud relating to the quality of RMBS that AIG had purchased from Countrywide and later were purchased by
ML II (Stempel 2013). Bank of America claimed that AIG had lost its right to sue when it sold the assets to ML
II, and that any recovery would be double-dipping (McEvoy 2013). A US District Court determined in May 2013
that AIG had not transferred certain of its litigation rights to ML II and could pursue claims against Bank of
America, causing AIG to drop a lawsuit against the FRBNY over the issue (Stempel 2013).
15
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BlackRock had already been contracted by the FRBNY to manage ML I16 and ML III assets
(Anantharaman 2008).
The FRBNY also hired Bank of New York Mellon as administrator and custodian, Deloitte and
Touche as external auditor for annual financial statements, and Ernst & Young to perform
closing work (Administration Agreement 2008, 2-7; FRBNY n.d.2; ML II LLC: Financial
Statements 2014, 4-5). Although the FRBNY devoted significant attention to the implications
of engaging outside vendors, there were a number of potential conflicts of interests that
arose between the FRBNY and vendors, which were dealt with on an ad hoc basis (GAO 2011,
122).
7. AIG was required to invest $1 billion on a junior basis.
The volatile state of the financial markets and the uncertainty surrounding the performance
of the RMBS purchased by ML II compelled the Fed to require an equity contribution by AIG
to cover the first billion dollars in potential losses (Baxter and Dahlgren 2010, 4-5). The Fixed
Deferred Purchase Price would be returned to AIG only after the payment of all costs
associated with the creation of ML II and repayment of the principal and interest on the
FRBNY’s senior loan (FRBNY 2008a). It was announced on February 28, 2012, that the AIG
contribution had been repaid in full, including accrued interest, using proceeds from the sale
of remaining ML II securities (FRBNY 2012c).
8. The interest rates for the FRBNY senior loan and AIG’s Fixed Deferred Purchase
Price were based on the one-month LIBOR.
The interest rates calculated on the FRBNY senior loan and AIG’s Fixed Deferred Purchase
Price referenced the one-month LIBOR (FRBNY 2008a). The FRBNY considered a number of
factors when deciding how to set rates for its interventions, including risk and characteristics
of the assets being purchased (GAO 2011, 90-91). Since ML II held securities that paid
monthly interest based on the one-month LIBOR, officials felt this was an appropriate rate
to use for the loan (GAO 2011, 90-91).
9. BlackRock Financial Management Inc. conducted mid-market pricing estimates of
the RMBS, which were used to negotiate purchase prices.
In order to value the RMBS that ML II was planning on purchasing, BlackRock provided midmarket pricing estimates based on projected cash flows from those RMBS (Asset Purchase
Agreement 2008, 9). These estimates used assumptions that were agreed upon by both
parties and were the basis for negotiations that took place between ML II and AIG regarding
the actual purchase price (Asset Purchase Agreement 2008, 9). It is important to note that
the mid-market pricing estimates provided by BlackRock may not have reflected the mark-

_____________________________________________________________________
Maiden Lane (ML I) was an SPV created in March 2008 to facilitate JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s purchase of Bear
Stearns Companies Inc.
16
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to-market price, in the case that there was a market for the product, because of the illiquid
nature of the RMBS market at the time (Asset Purchase Agreement 2008, 9).
10. The FRBNY did not specify a termination date or schedule for the loan, instead
setting the term at six years with the option for extension.
The terms of the loan to ML II specify that the senior loan was intended to be repaid from
interest and principal payments received from assets if held to maturity, or the proceeds
from their sale (FRBNY 2008a). As previously mentioned, the analysts at BlackRock
concluded that the securities would realize more value if held for a longer period of time.
This alleviated the risk of potential losses to the public by undertaking a buy-and-hold
strategy (US COP 2010, 141). If it was determined that liquidation was not the profitmaximizing option, ML II would be able to hold these assets to maturity, as the hold-tomaturity proceeds were predicted to be greater than the FRBNY’s senior loan (Baxter and
Dahlgren 2010, 6). The FRBNY announced its intention to begin liquidating the ML II
portfolio on March 30, 2011, citing improved market conditions and investor interest. At this
time, it also opted against outlining a fixed timeline for completing the sale. Rather, it allowed
for flexibility in order to maximize return: “There will be no fixed timeframe for the sales and
at each stage the Federal Reserve will only transact if the best available bid represents good
value for the public” (FRBNY 2011a). Sales were completed when the remainder of the assets
held by ML II were liquidated on February 28, 2012 (FRBNY 2012c).
11. ML II assets were sold off at competitive auctions over the course of an unspecified
time frame.
On March 30, 2011, it was announced that the FRBNY rejected AIG’s initial offer to buy back
all of the ML II assets (FRBNY 2011a). Instead, the FRBNY pursued a strategy of selling ML II
securities “individually and in segments rather than as a single block,” which would “give a
larger set of investors opportunity to bid for the assets [and] maximize sale proceeds while
also reducing the likelihood that any one institution ends up with concentrated exposure to
the assets” (FRBNY 2011a). In the event, the result was that, while $9.96 billion was sold in
a broad competitive bidding process to 22 bidders, the overwhelming majority of the assets
were sold in large blocks to major broker-dealers, resulting in some concentrated exposure
to the portfolio (see Figure 2: Sales of Maiden Lane II Assets in Competitive Auction Over
Time). The FRBNY discovered that after an initial positive reaction to individual auctions,
the market quickly grew weary of this protracted process. Demand was significantly greater
if investors had assurances that they could access larger segments of the portfolio. Therefore,
the second set of auctions consisted of large blocks, which remained open and competitive
but resulted in greater efficiency and better relative pricing.
The FRBNY finished selling the assets in February 2012, realizing a total residual profit of
$2.8 billion for the US government once ML II was terminated on November 12, 2014 (FRBNY
2012c; FRBNY n.d.1).
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12. The FRBNY followed a plan of transparency in disclosing information regarding
ML II.
Knowing that AIG was due to report a substantial loss for the third quarter on November 10,
2008, the FRBNY made the decision to announce its financial support restructuring on the
same day (US COP 2010, 138; GAO 2011, 53). Credit agencies had notified the FRBNY that
they would likely downgrade AIG in the wake of the disappointing earnings announcement,
and the potential for ensuing market turmoil led the FRBNY to communicate its plans earlier
than it might have otherwise (GAO 2011, 53). At 6:00 a.m. EST on November 10, 2008, the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors and Treasury Department issued a press release that
outlined a restructuring of financial support to AIG (BdofGov 2008). This restructuring
included purchasing $40 billion of preferred shares in AIG using Troubled Assets Relief
Program (TARP) funds, changes to the terms of the Revolving Credit Facility, and the
introduction of ML II and ML III (BdofGov 2008). The release describes these measures as an
attempt to “establish a more durable capital structure, resolve liquidity issues, facilitate AIG’s
execution of its plan to sell certain of its businesses in an orderly manner, promote market
stability, and protect the interests of the U.S. government and taxpayers.” (BdofGov 2008).
Announcement of the restructuring preceded its actual implementation by weeks.
In general, the FRBNY took a stance of transparency regarding ML II. It announced
developments and progress regularly and provided extensive detail on the assets held. For
example, in November 2008, it announced the intent to form ML II and purchase the RMBS
from AIG, and on March 30, 2011, it announced its intent to begin selling the assets over time
(BdofGov 2008; FRBNY 2011a). Included in that announcement was a commitment to
transparency and to providing information “as soon as is practicable,” as well as a detailed
communication plan (FRBNY 2011a):
“The New York Fed already publishes on its website a list of all the securities in its
portfolio. In order to allow the public to track progress on asset dispositions, the New
York Fed will provide monthly updates on portfolio holdings and a list of the
securities sold within the prior month. In addition, it will provide quarterly updates
on total proceeds from sales, and the total amount purchased by each counterparty.
Finally, the New York Fed will provide further details regarding these transactions,
including an account showing the acquirer and the price paid for each individual
security three months after the last asset is sold, ensuring timely accountability
without jeopardizing the ability to generate maximum sale proceeds for the public.”17

III. Evaluation
The Fed established Maiden Lane II as a temporary facility, the funding for which (i.e., the
FRBNY senior loan) could be extended indefinitely. Its purpose was to remove distressed
and illiquid RMBS from AIG’s balance sheet in order to address liquidity issues and relieve
rating-downgrade pressures arising from their falling values (Baxter and Dahlgren 2010, 45). The main objective was met, and ML II profitably sold off the assets in a series of
_____________________________________________________________________
17

This reported data can be found at FRBNY n.d.1.
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competitive auctions after having held them for approximately three years while the markets
stabilized, resulting in a net gain of approximately $2.8 billion (Baxter and Dahlgren 2010, 5;
FRBNY 2012c). However, there has been much criticism surrounding both the legality and
fiscal soundness of its utilization.
Because of ML II’s “complicated structure,” as discussed in Key Design Decision No. 2, the
Congressional Oversight Panel in hindsight adjudged the creation of the ML II facility to be a
“less straightforward fit with the Federal Reserve’s authority under Section 13(3),”
compared with the Fed’s two earlier loans to AIG. The COP noted that the Fed was “lending
money to itself” in order to purchase RMBS securities, each of which represented “a
promissory note or debt obligation” at a discount (US COP 2010, 228-229). Nevertheless,
despite ML II’s unusual form, the panel concluded that the facility was within the parameters
of the Fed’s Section 13(3) authority (US COP 2010, 228-229). Also, the 2011 GAO Report,
while critically considering several elements of the ML III facility, does not raise issues
regarding ML II (GAO 2011).
Still, some have questioned the risks the Fed took in establishing ML II for the purpose of
purchasing RMBS (US COP 2010, 251; McDonald and Paulson 2015, 99-100). What at first
seemed like an “insightful investment opportunity for the taxpayers,” reported the
Congressional Oversight Panel, was actually a “fortuitous and unanticipated rebound in the
markets” (US COP 2010, 251). In other words, because “most of [the assets purchased] were
arguably below junk status . . . there was no reasonable expectation that the RMBS . . . markets
would turn in the near future” (US COP 2010, 251).
The analysis by McDonald and Paulson (2015) reveals that the ML II assets suffered further
write-downs after the government sold them to Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse (McDonald
and Paulson 2015, 99-100). At the time of the sales in 2012, they show that 17.5% of ML II
securities had been written down since the beginning of ML II, representing a loss of 1.8%
for ML II. But the securities experienced further losses. As of October 31, 2014, 36% of the
ML II securities had experienced write-downs, representing a loss of 5.1% since the
beginning of ML II. Further losses appeared possible (McDonald and Paulson 2015, 100).
They conclude that the fact that ML securities “suffered write-downs means that we can
reject the stark claim that they were ‘money good’” at the time ML II was created (McDonald
and Paulson 2015, 100).
Despite the assets’ depressed value, BlackRock and FRBNY analysts concluded in 2008 that
the strategy of holding the assets to maturity while collecting interest income and principal
repayments would return greater proceeds than ML II’s debt to the FRBNY. Additionally, the
RMBS were previously rated AAA and were the senior tranche in their respective capital
structures (US COP 2010, 35). These assurances provided additional comfort to the FRBNY
regarding its decision to lend to ML II (Baxter and Dahlgren 2010, 6). Ultimately, markets did
rebound, and ML II liquidated its unmatured assets by the end of February 2012, fully paying
back the FRBNY and AIG and providing residual earnings (FRBNY 2012c; FRBNY n.d.1 ). In
short, according to an analysis by two economists, ML II purchased securities in 2008 for
$20.5 billion (at 53% of their par value), received $8.9 billion in interest and principal, and
sold them for $15.1 billion (51% of par), resulting in a nonannualized return of 17%
(McDonald and Paulson 2015, 98).
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Loan to be repaid in full (02/08/2012) – Press release announcing sale of some ML II assets.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4364
New York Fed Sells $7.014 Billion in Face Value of ML II LLC Assets (01/19/2012) – Press
release announcing sale of some ML II assets. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4365
New York Fed Sells Remainder of Maiden Lane II LLC Securities; Approximately $2.8 Billion
Net Gain Generated for U.S. Public from the Portfolio (02/28/2012) – Press release
announcing sale of some ML II assets. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/2951
Statement Regarding Recent Maiden Lane II Litigation Matters (03/01/2013) – FRBNY press
release
regarding
litigation
surrounding
assets
purchased
by
ML
II.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/statement-regarding-recent-maiden-lane-ii-litigationmatters
Statement Related to Offer by AIG to Purchase Maiden Lane II LLC (03/11/2011) – FRBNY
statement
disclosing
an
AIG
offer
submission.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_AIG_to_Purchase_M
LII_0.pdf
Media Stories
A.I.G. Buys $2 Billion in Maiden Lane Bonds (The New York Times - 02/24/2012) – Story
describing AIG’s purchase of ML II assets. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4344
AIG Buys Back $2B of Maiden Lane Mortgage Assets (Rizzetta 2012) – Story describing AIG’s
purchase
of
ML
II
assets.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Buys_Back_$2B_MLII_M
ortgage_Assets_2012.pdf
A.I.G. Seeks Approval to File More Bank Suits (The New York Times - 01/15/2013) – Story
describing litigation pursued by AIG. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4349
AIG’s Suit Against NY Fed Temporarily Halted (Sundar 2013) – Story describing litigation
pursued
by
AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG's_Suit_Against_NY_Fed_
Temporarily_Halted_2013.pdf
AIG Sues NY Fed Over Right to Billions in RMBS Claims (McAfee 2013) – Story describing
litigation
pursued
by
AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Sues_FRBNY_RMBS_Cla
ims_2013.pdf
Bailout Terms Kill AIG's $11B MBS Suit, BofA Says (McEvoy 2013) – Story describing
litigation
pursued
by
AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bailout_Terms_Kill_AIG's_$1
1B_MBS_Suit_2013_0.pdf
BlackRock to manage fund of AIG mortgage assets (Anantharaman 2008) – Story BlackRock
role
in
ML
II.
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BlackRock%20to%20mana
ge.pdf
Claiming Fraud in A.I.G. Bailout, Whistle-Blower Lawsuit Names 3 Companies (The New York
Times - 05/04/2011) – Story describing lawsuit against AIG, Goldman Sachs, and Deutsche
Bank. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4353
Fed rejects AIG bond offer, sets auction plan (Berkowitz and Cooke 2011) – Story on Fed plan
to
divest
ML
II
assets.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fed_Rejects_AIG_Bond_Offe
r_2011_0.pdf
A Question for A.I.G.: Where Did the Cash Go? (The New York Times - 10/29/2008) – Article
discussing
AIG’s
use
of
assistance
proceeds.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/A_Question_For_AIG_2008_
0.pdf
Key Academic Papers
Afterword to the AIG Bailout (Washington & Lee Law Review - 2015) – Paper detailing some
post-crisis
event
related
to
AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Sjostrom_University_of_Ariz
ona_Afterword_to_the_AIG_Bailout_20150404_0.pdf
The AIG Bailout (Washington & Lee Law Review - 2009) – Paper providing context
surrounding
AIG’s
collapse
and
rescue.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Afterword_AIG_Bailout_201
5.pdf
AIG in Hindsight (The Journal of Economic Perspectives - 2015) – Paper outlining AIG’s
collapse
and
rescue.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_in_Hindsight_2015_1.p
df
The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance Regulation (The Journal of
Risk and Insurance - 2009) – Paper discussing systemic risk in insurance.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fin_Crisis_Systemic_Risk_In
surance_Reg_2009.pdf
The Rescue of American International Group, Module Z: Overview (Journal of Financial
Crises – 2021, Vol. 3, Iss. 1) – Case study outlining the events and lessons of the AIG rescue
efforts. https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/
Reports/Assessments
AIG Remains in TARP as TARP’s Largest Investment. Quarterly Report to Congress
(07/25/2012) – Report from SIGTARP that discusses TARP investments in AIG,
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/SIGTARP_AIG_Remains_in_T
ARP_2012.pdf

141

The Rescue of American International Group Module D

Engbith and Jeffereis

American International Group’s Impact on the Global Economy: Before, During, and After
Federal Intervention (03/18/2009) – Congressional hearing proceedings discussing AIG’s
international
economic
impact.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Impact_Global_Econom
y_2009_1.pdf
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Quarterly Review, through June 30, 2011 – Spreadsheet
showing
some
of
ML
II’s
sales
by
counterparty.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/bidlistQ2_2011.xls
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Quarterly Review, through March 31, 2012 – Spreadsheet
showing
some
of
ML
II’s
sales
by
counterparty.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/MLIIcounterparty_033112.x
ls
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Involvement with the American International
Group before the Congressional Oversight Panel, House of Representatives, 111th Congress,
1 (2010) – Congressional testimony of Thomas Baxter and Sarah Dahlgren.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Baxter_Dahlgren_FRBNY_In
volvement_with_AIG_2010_1.pdf
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Vendor Information Archive (Accessed 12/14/2020) –
FRBNY webpage disclosing information about their vendors. (FRBNY n.d.1 2).
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Vendor%20Information%2
0Archive%20-%20FEDERAL%20RESERVE%20BANK%20of%20NEW%20YORK.pdf
Federal Reserve System: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Policies and Processes for
Managing Emergency Assistance (07/21/2011) – Research report discussing policies and
processes
of
Federal
Reserve
crisis
response.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GAO_Report_07-2011.pdf
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011) – Report detailing the causes and events of the
financial
crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FCIC_Report_2011.pdf
Financial Crisis: Review of Federal Reserve System Financial Assistance to American
International Group, Inc. (09/30/2011) – Research report that discusses government
lending
to
and
investments
in
AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GAO%20Report%20on%20
Federal%20Reserve%20AIG%20Intervention.pdf
Financial Statements for the Period October 31, 2008, to December 31, 2008, and
Independent Auditors’ Report (Maiden Lane II LLC 04/02/2009) – Document containing ML
II
financial
statements.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/MaidenLaneIIfinstmt2009.p
df
Financial Statements for the Year Ended December 31, 2009, and for the Period October 31,
2008, to December 31, 2008, and Independent Auditors’ Report (Maiden Lane II LLC
04/21/2010)
–
Document
containing
ML
II
financial
statements.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/ar09_MLII_LLC.pdf
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Financial Statements as of and for the Years Ended December 31, 2010, and 2009, and
Independent Auditors’ Report (Maiden Lane II LLC 03/22/2011) – Document containing ML
II
financial
statements.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/MLII_31811.pdf
Financial Statements as of and for the Years Ended December 31, 2011, and 2010, and
Independent Auditors’ Report (Maiden Lane II LLC 03/20/2012) – Document containing ML
II
financial
statements.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AR_ML_II_2011_Financial_St
atements.pdf
Financial Statements as of and for the Years Ended December 31, 2012, and 2011, and
Independent Auditors’ Report (Maiden Lane II LLC 03/14/2013) – Document containing ML
II
financial
statements.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AR_ML_II_2012_Financial_St
atements.pdf
Financial Statements as of and for the Years Ended December 31, 2013, and 2012, and
Independent Auditors’ Report (Maiden Lane II LLC 03/14/2014) – Document containing ML
II
financial
statements.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/MLII_Financial_Statements_
2012_2013.pdf
June Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit
Strategy. 111th Congress, 2nd session (06/10/2010) – Congressional Oversight Panel report
on AIG’s rescue, highlighting hearing testimonies, government actions, and impacts of
government
intervention.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Congressional_Oversight_Pa
nel_June_2010_Report_20100610_2.pdf
Lending in Support of Specific Institutions, Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs
(12/2011) – Federal Reserve information discussing credit and liquidity programs.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fed_Monthly_Report_Credit
_Liquidity_Programs_Balance_Sheet_2011_0.pdf
Ongoing Government Assistance for American International Group (AIG) (03/18/2010)
Congressional Research Service report describing contemporary government support of
AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CRS_Ongoing_Gov_Assistanc
e_AIG_2010_0.pdf
Periodic Report Pursuant to Section 129(b) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008: Update on Outstanding Lending Facilities Authorized by the Board Under Section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (02/25/2009) – Federal Reserve report to Congress on
emergency
lending
activity.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Section129_EESA_Update_O
utstanding_Lending_Facilities_2009.pdf
Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008:
Restructuring of the Government’s Financial Support to the American International Group
(11/10/2008) – Federal Reserve Report filed with Congress discussing the restructuring of
AIG
assistance.
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Section129_EESA_Restructu
ring_Gov_Fin_Support_AIG_2008.pdf
Secretary Written Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform (Geithner 2010) – Testimony of Treasury Secretary Geithner before a congressional
committee. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3014
Testimony on American International Group Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs (Kohn 2009) – Testimony of Governor Kohn of the Federal Reserve Board.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_Donald_Kohn_Testimo
ny_before_Senate_Committee_on_Banking_Housing_Urban_Affairs_20090305.pdf
Troubled Asset Relief Program: The Government’s Exposure to AIG Following the Company’s
Recapitalization (07/18/2011) – Research report discussing government investments in
AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/TARP_Gov_Exposure_AIG_G
AO-11-716_2011.pdf
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Status of Government Assistance Provided to AIG
(09/21/2009) – Research report discussing government investments in AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Status_Government_Assista
nce_Provided_AIG_GAO-09-975_2009.pdf
U.S. Department of the Treasury: Treasury Notes. Infographic: Overall $182 Billion
Committed to Stabilize AIG During the Financial Crisis is Now Fully Recovered. (Massad
2012) – Blog post discussing returns to date on government investments in AIG.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/infographic-overall-182-billion-committed-stabilize-aigduring-financial-crisis-now-fully
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